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Article
Changing the Immutable
SUSAN R. SCHMEISER
Over the past few decades, questions about the chosen or compelled
nature of sexual orientation have become both a political and a
constitutional litmus test for progressive approaches to LGBT rights.
While choice occupies a hallowed place in American culture, its invocation
in the context of sexual orientation generally has a more ambivalent, and
often sinister, ring. High-profile gaffes by prominent politicians make
clear that, in this context at least, pro-gay does not mean pro-choice. This
Article illuminates the rhetorical confusion surrounding homosexuality
and choice, linking it to a misguided jurisprudence of immutability. It
reflects briefly on the emergence and persistence of immutability as a
factor in equal protection challenges to discriminatory legislation,
suggesting that the focus on immutability represents an unnecessary
departure from the core purpose of equal protection jurisprudence: to
ensure that the government not apportion rights according to such
illegitimate considerations as paranoia or a desire to subordinate an
unpopular group.
The Connecticut Supreme Court’s analysis of
immutability in Kerrigan v. Department of Public Health, however, recasts
the inquiry to focus on the social and legal ostracism that has defined gay
identity for more than a century. This propitious approach is primarily
concerned with status as subordination (the new immutability) rather than
status as essence (the old immutability).
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Changing the Immutable
SUSAN R. SCHMEISER∗
To be ‘gay,’ I think, is not to identify with the
psychological traits and the visible masks of the homosexual,
but to try to define and develop a way of life.

-Michel Foucault, “Friendship as a Way of Life”1
I. CONFUSION AND THE POLITICS OF CHOICE
In a nationally televised debate between Democratic presidential
nominee John Kerry and Republican incumbent George W. Bush,
moderator Bob Schieffer of CBS News posed a peculiar question to the
candidates, one that would seem to have little relevance to presidential
politics: “Do you believe homosexuality is a choice?” President Bush
equivocated, affirming his support for a constitutional amendment limiting
marriage to heterosexual couples while professing “tolerance,” but Senator
Kerry offered a more pointed response:
We’re all God’s children, Bob. And I think if you were to
talk to Dick Cheney’s daughter, who is a lesbian, she would
tell you that she’s being who she was, she’s being who she
was born as. I think if you talk to anybody, it’s not choice.
I’ve met people who struggled with this for years, people
who were in a marriage because they were living a sort of
convention, and they struggled with it. And I’ve met wives
who are supportive of their husbands or vice versa when they
finally sort of broke out and allowed themselves to live who
they were, who they felt God had made them. I think we
2
have to respect that.
Kerry’s “born-that-way” gesture of support for gay, lesbian and
bisexual rights, however measured, took on the status of a calculated smear
∗
Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. I extend hearty thanks to Chris Argyros,
who provided superb research assistance, and to the many friends and colleagues who have indulged
me over the years as I ranted against the politics of immutability. I am also grateful to Jill Anderson for
her deft interventions and to the editors of the Connecticut Law Review, particularly Krystyna
Blakeslee, for their labor and patience.
1
MICHEL FOUCAULT, Friendship as a Way of Life, in FOUCAULT LIVE (INTERVIEWS, 1966–84)
204 (Sylvère Lotringer ed., John Johnston trans., 1989).
2
Third Bush-Kerry Presidential Debate (CBS television broadcast Oct. 13, 2004) (transcript
available at http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004d_p.html).
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with his ad hominem invocation of a prominent Republican family to
illustrate the putative nature of sexual orientation. Whether slip or political
strategy, Kerry’s mention of Mary Cheney, daughter of the sitting vice
president and Bush’s running mate in the 2004 election, proved to be a
costly indiscretion indeed. These remarks precipitated such negative and
inflammatory reactions that many campaign observers identified this
3
exchange as a decisive moment in Kerry’s failed bid for president.
His evocation of Mary Cheney’s sexual orientation aside, Kerry’s
response performs a series of associations that resonate strongly with
arguments for LGBT rights. In these remarks, Kerry juxtaposes the
essential and God-given fact of homosexuality against the anguished
performance of straight marriage, which has trapped men and women in
lies until “they finally sort of broke out and allowed themselves to live who
4
they were.” Thus marriage as compulsory heterosexuality requires gay
men and lesbians to sacrifice truth to convention. Hence, without
expressing actual support for same-sex marriage—a position that few
prominent figures in national politics have been willing thus far to take—
Kerry conveyed the coercive force of institutionalized heterosexuality to
pervert the natural order of things. In this account, nature, conceived here
as divine creation, contravenes traditional morality; God’s morality
therefore trumps the human morality that would incarcerate our true selves.
At the time of this October 2004 exchange, calls for an amendment to
the United States Constitution enshrining heterosexual marriage as an
indelible component of American democracy and legal culture had reached
5
a political crescendo. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health made
marriage newly available to same-sex couples in Massachusetts, while the
Republican platform eagerly embraced the Federal Marriage Amendment.6
With Vermont’s civil unions yielding to full marriage rights in
7
Massachusetts and beyond, rhetoric surrounding the so-called “culture
wars” posited threats to the traditional family as a greater menace to
3
See, e.g., Ron Hutcheson, Analysis: Many Bush Supporters Almost Voted for Kerry, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, Nov. 6, 2004, at 8A (“Kerry made a big mistake when he dragged Vice President Dick
Cheney’s lesbian daughter into the third presidential debate, the studies showed.”).
4
Third Bush-Kerry Presidential Debate, supra note 2.
5
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003) (declaring exclusion of
same-sex couples from state-sanctioned marriage a violation of the Massachusetts constitution).
6
S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_bills&docid=f:sj40pcs.txt.pdf.
For discussion of the Federal
Marriage Amendment’s history in Congress, see Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment
and the False Promise of Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 533–34 (2008); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr. & E. Gary Spitko, Navigating Dangerous Constitutional Straits: A Prolegomenon on
the Federal Marriage Amendment and the Disenfranchisement of Sexual Minorities, 76 U. COLO. L.
REV. 599, 599–601 (2005); Joan Schaffner, The Federal Marriage Amendment: To Protect the Sanctity
of Marriage or Destroy Constitutional Democracy?, 54 AM. U.L. REV. 1487, 1487–90 (2005).
7
Compare Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (recognizing same-sex unions), with
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948 (recognizing full marriage rights).
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American democracy than the battles roiling the Middle East and the
ubiquitous threat of terrorism captured by the Department of Homeland
8
Security’s color-coded threat alert.
By October 2008, when the Connecticut Supreme Court issued its
decision in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health granting full
marriage rights to same-sex couples,9 another presidential election-cycle
neared completion. In the four years that had elapsed since Kerry incited
outrage by identifying Cheney’s daughter as a lesbian, the question that
elicited Kerry’s remark proved more tenacious than the proposed
constitutional amendment itself, which last received serious consideration
10
For instance, when the Gallup News Service announced the
in 2006.
results of its 2007 annual Values and Beliefs survey, the organization
found support for gay rights approaching its highest level yet—a recovery
from the backlash that surveys detected following the Supreme Court’s
11
decision in Lawrence v. Texas. In its coverage of the survey results,
Gallup emphasized that “Americans who believe homosexuals are born
with their sexual orientation tend to be much more supportive of gay rights
than are those who say homosexuality is due to upbringing and
12
If
environment (and therefore, perhaps, more of a lifestyle choice).”
anything, the question of choice only gained more salience in political
discourse and popular culture, where media accounts of scientific research
on sexual orientation in human society as well as the animal world confer
13
ongoing relevance and strong entertainment value on the subject.
8
The color-coded threat alert system emerged under former President George W. Bush in a 2002
Presidential Directive. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL
DIRECTIVE 3 (2002), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1214508631313.shtm#content
(establishing the Homeland Security Advisory System, with five “Threat Conditions” identified by
colors ranging from green, or low threat, to red, or severe threat). Same-sex marriage and other hotbutton cultural issues factored as prominently in the 2004 elections, surfacing not only in debates and
campaign rhetoric but in ballot measures across the country adopting bans on same-sex marriage and
marriage-like recognition in state constitutions and statutory codes. Many commentators analyzed
President Bush’s victory and other election results as signs of a political backlash precipitated by
Goodridge and Lawrence v. Texas. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and
Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 466–72 (2005) (documenting “the backlash ignited by the issue of
same-sex marriage” in the 2004 elections).
9
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2008).
10
See Colby, supra note 6, at 571 (describing the Amendment’s failure to gain the required twothirds majority in a House vote in 2006 and noting that the FMA was dropped from the legislative
agenda when the Democrats gained control of Congress in the 2006 midterm elections).
11
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (invalidating on due process grounds a Texas law
that criminalized same-sex sodomy and overruling Bowers v. Hardwick).
12
Lydia Saad, Tolerance for Gay Rights at High-Water Mark: Public Evenly Divided over
Whether Homosexuality Is Morally Acceptable or Wrong, GALLUP NEWS SER., May 29, 2007,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/27694/Tolerance-Gay-Rights-HighWater-Mark.aspx.
13
See, e.g., Dinitia Smith, Love That Dare Not Squeak its Name, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7 2004
(documenting same-sex bonding and mating behavior among penguins); Deborah Solomon, Same-Sex
Selection, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 9, 2004, at 17 (interviewing Stanford biology professor Joan
Roughgarden, who claims that “if you ask any biologist, they can verify for you that they have either
seen homosexuality in animals, or they know someone who has seen it, and never reported it”); James
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Not surprisingly, the 2008 election saw its own controversies over the
etiology of homosexuality. During the primaries, Democratic candidate
Bill Richardson, governor of New Mexico, committed a different sort of
misstep in traversing the dangerous terrain of choice. Prominent advocacy
organization Human Rights Campaign partnered with gay-themed
television channel Logo to host an event for presidential candidates
focused on issues germane to the LGBT community. (Since only the
Democratic candidates agreed to participate in this event, the organizers
staged a single forum.) Singer Melissa Etheridge posed an apparent
softball question to Governor Richardson, asking, “Do you think
homosexuality is a choice, or is it biological?” Heedless to cues prompting
him toward the opposite conclusion, Richardson replied with alacrity, “It’s
a choice.” His answer provoked gasps and hisses from the audience and a
puzzled follow-up from Etheridge, who suggested that Richardson might
not have understood the question. In subsequent remarks, Richardson
declined to retract his answer, insisting instead that he was not a scientist
and therefore preferred not to speculate on scientific explanations: “I see
gays and lesbians as people, as a matter of human decency. I see it as a
matter of love and companionship and people loving each other. I don’t
like to categorize people.”14 Immediately following the event, though,
Richardson’s campaign issued a statement negating the voluntarist account
15
at work in his response.
In an interview the following day with a journalist representing an
online publication, Richardson explained his apparent stumble,
Owen, Homosexual Activity Among Animals Stirs Debate, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, July 23, 2004,
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2004/07/0722_040722_gayanimal.html (describing studies
on the sexual habits of animals and their connection to human homosexuality); Steven Pinker,
Editorial, Sniffing Out the Gay Gene, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2005, at A21 (discussing a study which
detailed the human brain’s response to chemical signals called pheromones in an attempt to learn more
about human sexuality); Michael Abrams, Born Gay?, DISCOVER, June 2007, at 58, 60 (arguing that
studies on the sexuality of men have proved that a male’s sexual orientation has a genetic cause and is
not the result of an individual’s environment); Alice Park, What the Gay Brain Looks Like, TIME.COM,
June 17, 2008, http://www.time. com/time/health/article/0,8599,1815538,00.html (indicating that the
use of brain scans of men and women can determine what role brain size has in determining an
individual’s sexuality); John Schwartz, Of Gay Sheep, Modern Science, and the Perils of Bad Publicity,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2007, at A1 (describing the controversy surrounding research on sexual
orientation in sheep).
14
Quoted in CNN Politicalticker blog, Richardson flubs answer at gay forum, available at
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2007/08/10/richardson-flubs-answer-at-gay-forum/;
see
also
Jonathan Capehart, Wrong Answer, Governor; The Democratic Calculus on Gay Rights Issues, WASH.
POST, Aug. 13, 2007, at A11; Mike Dorning & Christi Parsons, Dems Walk Fine Line at GayIissues
Forum; Rights Yes, Marriage No, Richardson Calls Orientation ‘A Choice,’ CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug.
10, 2007 at C4.
15
Richardson’s campaign ostensibly clarified the Governor’s position in an e-mail message
distributed to reporters shortly after the event: “I do not believe that sexual orientation or gender
identity happen by choice. But I’m not a scientist, and the point I was trying to make is that no matter
how it happens, we are all equal and should be treated that way under the law.” Ewen MacAskill,
Democratic Candidates Tread Carefully at Gay Rights Forum, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 11, 2007, at 23;
see also Capehart, Wrong Answer, Governor, supra note 14.
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illuminating the lexical promiscuity of “choice” itself.
Andrew Belonsky: Let’s start with “I’m not a scientist.”
Of course you’re not. You’re a governor. What was going
through your head when you stepped off the stage whether or
not homosexuality is a choice?
Bill Richardson: I immediately realized that I had to fix
my statement. I was confused by the question. I just simply
made a mistake. I misunderstood the question. My
impression—I thought it was a tricky science question, where
you put politics into science. I think the word Melissa used
was “biological”. Since I use “choice” so much, I’m so
committed to choice—a woman’s right to choose—I thought
16
that was the appropriate answer.
Although here and in subsequent coverage of this event Richardson blamed
his confusion on fatigue, the account he provided to this interviewer
supports a more complex explanation. While liberal politicians celebrate
“choice” in the context of reproductive freedom and various areas of
individual and group rights, persuaded by feminism and other political
movements to reject the notion of biology as destiny, the progressive
endorsement of choice requires an abrupt reversal where voluntarism
becomes a basis for censure and discrimination. Another moment from the
2008 campaign will further illustrate this paradox.
Republican candidate Senator John McCain publicly opposed efforts to
write heterosexual marriage into the United States Constitution, but his
running mate, Governor Sarah Palin of Alaska, considered the matter
suitable for constitutional intervention. An amendment to the Alaska
constitution limiting marriage to heterosexual couples, one of the first of its
kind, gained passage a decade earlier in 1998; Palin indicated her support
for a similar measure at the federal level. In her much-lampooned
television interview with CBS anchor Katie Couric, Governor Palin
remarked:
I have, one of my absolute best friends for the last 30
years who happens to be gay. And I love her dearly. And
she is not my “gay friend.” She is one of my best friends
who happens to have made a choice that isn’t a choice that I
have made. But I am not gonna judge people. And I love
America where we are more tolerant than other countries are.
16
Queerty.com, Richardson’s Gay “Choice”: What He Was Thinking, Where God Fits and How
Hubert Humphrey Got Him Started, http://www.queerty.com/richardsons-gay-choice-20070810/ (last
visited Apr. 11, 2009) (transcribing Queerty.com editor Andrew Belonsky’s August 10, 2007,
interview with Governor Bill Richardson).
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And are more accepting of some of these choices that
sometimes people want to believe reflects solely on an
individual’s values or not. Homosexuality, I am not gonna
17
judge people.
Her insistence to the contrary notwithstanding, Governor Palin’s comment
deployed a some-of-my-best-friends-are-gay logic to convey a potentially
less friendly message: that “being” gay is a matter of choice. When
Richardson suggested as much, he came off as bumbling and ill-prepared;
indeed, his campaign issued a correction eschewing the choice argument
within hours after the HRC event.18 When Palin espoused the language of
choice, however, she cannily aligned herself with the conservative position
on sexual orientation, understanding homosexuality as a matter of
individual values and preferences that, while no longer punished explicitly
in a pluralist democracy, do not warrant governmental endorsement. Her
rhetoric also resonates with discourses condemning same-sex eroticism as
a deliberate rejection of civilized morality, an elevation of corporeal
indulgence over spiritual devotion, and an embrace of self-gratification at
the expense of family and community. The rhetoric of choice thus
performs significant ideological work in these exchanges, however
incoherently.
I recount these three incidents in an attempt to convey the high stakes
surrounding the question of choice and to illuminate its oddly incendiary
function in debates over homosexuality. While choice and its conditions of
possibility occupy a hallowed place in American culture and politics, its
invocation in the context of sexual orientation generally has a more
ambivalent, and often sinister, ring. For several decades, the question of
choice has polarized discussions of gay, lesbian and bisexual identities,
communities, and practices. Conservative opponents of LGBT rights tend
to argue that homosexuality is nothing more nor less than a series of
behavioral choices: choices to sin, to indulge, to flout the moral strictures
essential to a stable and virtuous life, to elevate hedonistic interests over
altruistic ones.19 Even without explicitly embracing a model of choice,
17

Katie Couric’s Interview of Sarah Palin and John McCain (Sept. 30, 2008) (transcript available
at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/09/30/eveningnews/main4490788_page3.shtml); see also
Nathaniel Frank, Editorial, Gay Is a Choice? Not That Again; Palin’s View Ignores That, as in
Religion, the Attraction is Undeniable, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at A23 (criticizing Palin’s responses).
18
See MacAskill, supra note 15.
19
In the words of one newspaper editor, “If you want to condemn gays to hell, it helps to believe
they have chosen a ‘lifestyle’ based ‘simply on the premise of selfish hedonism,’ as Alan L. Keyes, the
GOP candidate for Senate in Illinois, recently said of the Cheneys’ lesbian daughter, Mary. For people
such as Mr. Keyes, homosexuality has to be viewed as a choice. Otherwise, it couldn’t be a sin.”
Cynthia Tucker, No, It’s Not a Choice, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 25, 2004, at 15A. One young
conservative author is currently traveling to college and university campuses to lecture students on the
“born gay hoax” in an effort to debunk popular theories of congenital homosexuality. See Matt
Maguire, Smith College Students Protest the ‘Born Gay Hoax,’ BAY WINDOWS, May 5, 2008; see also
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some conservative commentators advance anti-gay arguments by noting
the inconclusive evidence of biological determinism and exploiting the
epistemological uncertainty surrounding the causes of sexual orientation.20
Perhaps Governor Richardson’s alleged “confusion” around the function of
choice in discussions of sexual orientation makes more sense when one
learns that the president-elect of the National Association for the Research
and Therapy of Homosexuality (“NARTH”), an organization devoted to
“curing” homosexuality, recently announced to a crowd of therapists
convened to discuss treatment methods: “When it comes to homosexuality,
I’m pro-choice!”21
With choice increasingly conscripted into the service of homophobic
causes, it comes as little surprise that many pro-gay arguments wield
determinism to counter discriminatory policies. Advocates for LGBT
rights have seized upon—and catalyzed—scientific research into the
etiology of sexual orientation to contend that homosexuality has a basis in
biology or is otherwise determined by factors outside of individual control
yet essential to self-development.22 For instance, HRC distributes
Gary Greenberg, Gay By Choice? The Science of Sexual Identity, MOTHER JONES, Sept.–Oct. 2007, at
60 (describing the centrality of choice to anti-gay therapies seeking to convert patients to
heterosexuality or celibacy); Exodus International, www.exodusinternational.org (last visited May 15,
2009) (offering “freedom from homosexuality through the power of Jesus Christ”).
20
In one recent example of this rhetorical strategy, a law professor and prolific critic of gayfriendly family policies challenged immutability claims while advocating a shift in focus from the
etiology of homosexuality to its putative health risks. See Lynne D. Wardle, The Biological Causes
and Consequences of Homosexual Behavior and Their Consequences for Family Law Policies, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 997, 1012–14 (2007) (arguing for the mutability of sexual attraction); id. at 1016
(maintaining that, even if of unknown origin, homosexuality produces known risks). Professor
Wardle’s article represents a striking example of the extent to which opponents of LGBT rights exploit
the manifold inconsistencies haunting accounts of sexual orientation predicated on genetic
determinism. Although I disagree strongly with Professor Wardle’s conclusions, I think he makes a
powerful case against the spurious hunt for the “causes” of homosexuality and its role in organizing
movements against discrimination on behalf of sexual minorities.
21
Greenberg, Gay By Choice?, supra note 19, at 60. NARTH was founded by psychiatrist
Charles Socarides, the doctor who famously championed “reparative therapy” for gay patients and
vigorously opposed the American Psychiatric Association’s 1973 decision to “delist” homosexuality
from the second edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-II). See
id.; see also RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF
DIAGNOSIS 115–38 (1986) (recounting events culminating in the deletion of homosexuality from the
DSM-II).
22
One of the strongest proponents of this position is writer Chandler Burr, author of A Separate
Creation: The Search for the Biological Origins of Sexual Orientation (1996). In a white paper written
on behalf of the Log Cabin Republicans, an advocacy organization supporting gay and lesbian rights in
conjunction with conservative policies, Burr declared provocatively that the question of choice, along
with the scientific evidence debunking volitional theories of sexual orientation, is and should remain at
the heart of debates over gay issues: “At its core, the answer to this question is the only one that
matters, the one that determines the most appropriate public policy course, and the one that will win the
political struggle over gay rights: Is homosexuality a lifestyle choice or is homosexuality an inborn
biological trait? Put another way, does someone choose to be gay or are they just born that way?”
Chandler Burr, The Only Question that Matters: Do People Choose Their Sexual Orientation? LOG
CABIN REPUBLICANS WHITE PAPER, June 2005, available at http://www.chandlerburr.com/articles/
Burr_White_Paper.html.
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educational literature on issues affecting lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender people; a widely disseminated pamphlet devoted to “Coming
Out” reassures its readers that “Your Sexuality or Gender Identity Is Not a
Choice. It Chooses You.”23
Is homosexuality in fact a choice? This deceptively facile question
suffers from a confounding incoherence, including potentially
What
incommensurable descriptive and normative implications.24
referential parameters mark the subject (“homosexuality”) of such a
question? Does “homosexuality” refer to desires, fantasies, attractions,
arousals, advances, nongenital contacts, or genital contacts directed toward
same-gendered objects? To what extent does this referent encompass selfattribution, identification by others, or membership in a particular
community?25 Is homosexuality the opposite of heterosexuality? Does the
category describe only human phenomena, or does it capture the activities
and affective states of non-human animals? And what of choice? Is
choice any exercise of “free will”? Does “choice” require a process of
selection, or merely an intentional act? If a process of selection, then
against what other options is homosexuality chosen? What conditions of
possibility must obtain to enable choice: unfettered freedom, or merely the
absence of coercion? Is choice necessary for autonomy and selfdetermination? Such a simple question quickly dissolves into a conceptual
muddle.
Even if readers dismiss this inquiry as an exercise in sophistry, I hope
to persuade them in the remainder of this Article that the question posed to
Kerry, Richardson, and others should be put to rest in politics and
jurisprudence alike. In particular, I suggest that the potential mutability of
sexual orientation lacks relevance to a reasoned analysis of whether laws
that discriminate on this basis warrant heightened scrutiny. Toward that
end, I offer a condensed account below of the jurisprudential and political
forces that elevated this question to a state of spurious magnitude. Part II
provides a brief introduction to the emergence and persistence of
immutability as a factor in equal protection challenges to discriminatory
legislation, suggesting that the focus on immutability represents an
23
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, RESOURCE GUIDE TO COMING OUT FOR GAY,
LESBIAN, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER AMERICANS 11 (2004).
24
See, e.g., EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 83–84 (1990) (“For
surely, if paradoxically, it is the paranoid insistence with which the definitional barriers between ‘the
homosexual’ [minority] and ‘the heterosexual’ [majority] are fortified, in this century, by
nonhomosexuals, and especially by men against men, that most saps one’s ability to believe in ‘the
homosexual’ as an unproblematically discrete category of persons.”).
25
In her pioneering conceptualizations of queer theory, then only a burgeoning field, Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwick brilliantly troubled the assumption that sexual identity constitutes a “unitary
category,” noting in one essay that “what’s striking is the number and difference of the dimensions that
‘sexual identity’ is supposed to organize into a seamless and univocal whole.” EVE KOSOFSKY
SEDGWICK, Queer and Now, in TENDENCIES 8 (1993).
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unnecessary departure from the core purpose of equal protection
jurisprudence: to ensure that the government not apportion rights, benefits
and obligations according to such illegitimate considerations as paranoia or
a desire to subordinate an unpopular group, and that its laws and policies
26
not in fact enact such stratification. In other words, as the United States
Supreme Court famously declared in Palmore v. Sidoti, “[p]rivate biases
may be outside the reach of law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly,
give them effect.”27
Part III turns to recent applications of immutability in cases
challenging sexual orientation discrimination. Within this jurisprudence,
some courts find sexual orientation, and homosexuality in particular,
insufficiently immutable to warrant judicial solicitude. Other courts take a
more permissive approach to immutability as a factor, deeming it relatively
inconsequential to equal protection analysis and/or broadening its scope to
include qualities central to personhood that may be resistant, if not entirely
immune, to change. Among these latter cases, I identify the Connecticut
Supreme Court’s analysis of immutability in Kerrigan as a particularly
welcome departure from the misplaced focus on the nature of group
identity, specifically its conditions for entry and exit, in favor of an inquiry
into the nature of discrimination and its pernicious effects. In its brief but
compelling analysis of the immutability factor and, more generally, its
application of heightened scrutiny to a marriage regime relegating gay men
and lesbians to second-class status in their partnerships and families, the
majority opinion deftly elucidates the perlocutionary force of legislative
classifications. Kerrigan exemplifies the role of judicial review as a
bulwark against the ills of majoritarian democracy and its potentially
tyrannical excesses, and thereby provides a means of graceful exit from the
immutability morass in which equal protection analysis has become mired.
With the decline of criminal sanctions for same-sex eroticism in Lawrence
and beyond, there is no longer any jurisprudential reason to embrace a
model of homosexuality as compulsive and ineluctable.
Finally, in Part IV, I evoke a broader cultural and theoretical context
for my contention that progressive arguments on behalf of sexual26
As the Supreme Court has noted on several occasions, “If the constitutional conception of
‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” Department
of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1997)
(striking down an amendment to the Colorado constitution that barred antidiscrimination measures on
behalf of sexual minorities). Thus mere animus will not survive even rational basis review. In
Democracy and Distrust, John Hart Ely observed famously that, “[f]or whatever else it may or may not
be, prejudice is a lens that distorts reality. We are a nation of minorities and our system thus depends
on the ability and willingness of various groups to apprehend those overlapping interests that can bind
them into a majority on a given issue; prejudice blinds us to overlapping interests that in fact exist.”
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 54 (1980).
27
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
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orientation minorities need not and must not cede choice and selfdetermination to the realm of homophobia. This Part offers a brief
historical account of the development of a medico-legal discourse around
homosexuality, with an eye toward the ways in which attributions of
diminished will cast gay men and lesbians as incapable of full autonomy or
democratic participation. In light of this history and the jurisprudential
incoherence that has plagued immutability, it seems essential to continue
along Kerrigan’s path toward retiring the issue altogether.
My purpose throughout this Article is neither to champion nor to
debunk theories of biological or congenital immutability in the context of
28
sexual orientation. Nor do I wish to propose an alternative conception of
immutability in individual self-definition that would circumvent the
difficulties of scientific proof in this area.29 A rich scholarly literature that
first emerged some fifteen years ago has begun to accomplish all of these
30
missions already. Instead, I perceive immutability as a constitutional red
28
For accounts supporting scientific research into sexual orientation and its origins, see generally
TIMOTHY F. MURPHY, GAY SCIENCE, THE ETHICS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION RESEARCH Ch. 2 (1997)
(The Value of Sexual Orientation Research) (arguing that the potential benefits of scientific research on
sexual orientation outweigh its potential misuse); Kari Balog, Note, Equal Protection for Homosexuals:
Why the Immutability Argument is Necessary and How it is Met, 53 CL. ST. L. REV. 545, 557–58
(2005–2006) (“The plethora of scientific and medical research available on sexual orientation answers
the question of immutability in the affirmative. Homosexuals do not take a risk in invoking the
immutability argument in equal protection claims because the medical and scientific research positively
shows sexual orientation to be as immutable as gender.”); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive
Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U.L. REV. 573, 583–90 (offering positive reviews of scientific research
into the basis for sexual orientation).
For critiques of the scientistic approach to immutability and equal protection, see EDWARD STEIN,
THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE: THE SCIENCE, THEORY, AND ETHICS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION Ch. 10
(1999) (Rights and the Science of Sexual Orientation); id. Ch. 12 (Should Scientific Research on Sexual
Orientation Be Done?); JENNIFER TERRY, AN AMERICAN OBSESSION: SCIENCE, MEDICINE AND
HOMOSEXUALITY IN MODERN SOCIETY (1999) (offering an historical account of scientific fascination
with homosexuality as the abnormal other against which to measure the shifting bounds of the
“normal”); id. at 394 (contending that arguments for the immutability of homosexuality betray a
misreading of the scientific research).
29
For recent proposals advancing conceptions of immutability that transcend the nature vs.
nurture divide, see, for example, Shannon Gilreath, Of Fruit Flies and Men: Rethinking Immutability in
Equal Protection Analysis—With a View Toward a Constitutional Moral Imperative, 9 J.L. & SOC.
CHANGE 1, 31 (2006) (eschewing trait immutability as a basis for equal protection in favor of trait
coercion where a trait such as homosexuality describes an essential aspect of individual identity);
Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646, 650 (2001) (proposing a
“new vision of immutability” that encompasses the social construction of identity). Professor
Marcosson in particular seeks to reinvigorate immutability, arguing that, “[p]roperly understood and
argued, immutability has resonance both within and outside the legal sphere, and can be of particularly
great force in winning the fifth for equality for sexual and gender minorities.” Id. at 649. Marcosson’s
approach most closely resembles the one pursued by the majority in Kerrigan. The focus on qualities
central to personal identity found early expression in a Harvard Law Review Note, where the editors
wrote: “An alternative view of the importance of immutability might . . . focus on the argument that the
characteristics of race and sex are important not because they are (usually) determined at birth, but
because they are such determinative features of personality.” Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual
Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1303 (1985).
30
In a 1994 article routinely cited by scholars and courts alike (both supporting and challenging
sexual orientation discrimination), Professor Janet Halley offered a trenchant critique of biological
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herring, a perilous strategy for demanding civil rights, and a cultural
side-show whose dramatic contrivances, evident in the incidents I relayed
above, distract us from the real questions of liberty and equality that
32
demand jurisprudential resolution.
II. THE IMMUTABILITY MORASS
In a story familiar to students of constitutional law, the Supreme Court
opinion in United States v. Carolene Products (1938) famously gestured
toward a “more searching judicial inquiry” in cases where legislation
targeting unpopular groups reflects the sort of “prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities” that also “tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
33
minorities.” In other words, the Court suggested that the very animosity
determinism as a basis for identity-based legal protections. See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and
the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 567–68
(1994) [hereinafter Politics of Biology] (denouncing efforts to ground pro-gay advocacy on the
inconclusive and conceptually muddled science of homosexuality and advocating instead a middle
ground between constructivist and essentialist conceptions of identity). My own understanding of the
choice morass is substantially influenced by Halley’s work, which eloquently documents the
incoherence surrounding scientistic claims to immutability when the very categories organizing this
scientific research, homosexuality and heterosexuality, remain thoroughly unstable. See id. at 567; see,
e.g., Carmen M. Butler, Victimhood to Agency: A Constructionist Comparison of Sexual Orientation to
Religious Orientation, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 147, 166 (2005) (contending that “[a]dvocates who use
essentialist theory to promote gay rights inadvertently support a static image of sexuality in general and
a victim image of gays in particular”); Janet Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and
After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1770 (1993) [hereinafter Act and Identity] (noting the
instability of acts and identities in the Court’s focus on “homosexual sodomy” and calling upon “those
of us who inhabit gay and lesbian identity [to] loosen our grip on these identities”); Jonathan Pickhardt,
Note, Choose or Loose: Embracing Theories of Choice in Gay Rights Litigation Strategies, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 921 (1998) (cataloguing the strategic failure and collateral effects of “choice-denying”
arguments for LGBT rights litigation and advocating instead a “choice-affirming” approach).
31
Nancy Knauer makes a compelling case for the perils of embracing immutability, asserting
provocatively that “the pro-gay insistence on immutability represents the Achilles’ heel of the
contemporary gay political narrative. Claims of immutability rest on a shaky factual basis, produce
stable desexualized gay subjects with no transformative value, and they are ultimate unresponsive to
the pro-family characterization of homosexuality as a chosen and immoral behavior.” Nancy J.
Knauer, Science, Identity, and the Construction of the Gay Political Narrative, 12 L. & SEXUALITY 1, 7
(2003). The writings of Lynne Wardle and other anti-gay conservatives amply bear out these warnings.
See generally Wardle, supra note 20 (suggesting that homosexuality constitutes a public health menace,
whatever its etiology).
32
See generally Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2000) (arguing that equal protection analysis should focus on “the meaning or expressive
content of the law or policy at issue” and whether that “meaning conflicts with the government's
obligation to treat each person with equal concern”).
33
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). The relevant passage reads
in full:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under
the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation. . . . Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the
review of statutes directed at particular religious . . . or racial minorities . . . ;
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catalyzing legislation that disfavors certain groups likely yields formidable
hurdles as well to their use of political processes to seek and achieve equal
treatment under law.
Out of this recognition emerged the tiers of scrutiny that now organize
34
This “more
equal protection analysis, to significant consternation.
searching judicial inquiry” traverses different paths depending, at least in
theory, on the likelihood that the laws under review reflect “prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities” and therefore warrant heightened
scrutiny by courts.35 Oddly, however, efforts to illuminate and counter
irrational prejudice frequently metamorphosed into efforts to identify the
precise nature of the group alleging prejudice. Odder still, courts paid
particular attention to the criteria of group membership, specifically the
conditions for entry and exit. In other words, an inquiry into the nature and
effects of prejudice succumbed to an inquiry into the nature of identity:
voluntary or involuntary, essential or inessential?
Viewed from this angle, heightened-scrutiny analysis took a series of
obfuscatory detours that led courts astray from the central precepts of equal
protection and judicial review in guarding against government-sponsored
subordination. Indeed, scholars have argued persuasively that the
interpolation of immutability as a factor in equal protection analysis—
much less a requirement—was itself historically contingent and likely
36
unnecessary to the effective review of discriminatory classifications.
Immutability first surfaced as a litigation strategy in equal protection cases
to highlight parallels between racism and sexism (rather than race and sex)
as irrational prejudices predicated on stereotypes and unfounded
assumptions. Yet it soon became an inconsistent litmus test for access to
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry. . . .
Id.

34
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (declaring racial classifications
“immediately suspect” and “subject . . . to the most rigid scrutiny”). See generally, e.g., Suzanne
Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004) (offering a comprehensive account
and critique of the multi-tiered approach); id. at 527–33 (proposing a uniform alternative that would
hew more closely to the spirit of equal protection analysis). Korematsu, which upheld the internment
of Japanese Americans during the Second World War, reflected the first explicit application of strict
(although remarkably indulgent) scrutiny to a racial classification.
35
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
36
See generally Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375 (1999)
(challenging biological theories of race and their significance to equal protection analysis); id. at 1453
(chronicling the litigation strategy of ACLU attorney Ruth Bader Ginsburg to tether sex differences to
biology in two early sex discrimination cases seeking heightened scrutiny for sex-based
classifications); Nan D. Hunter, The Sex Discrimination Argument in Gay Rights Cases, 9 J.L. & POL’Y
397, 402–04 (2001) (recounting the same events); Marc R. Shapiro, Treading the Supreme Court’s
Murky Immutability Waters, 38 GONZAGA L. REV. 409, 437–38 (2002/2003) (lamenting the Supreme
Court’s failure to define immutability and the extent to which the concept perpetuates discredited
scientific theories of race).
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37

heightened scrutiny.
In Frontiero v. Richardson, one of its earliest
decisions invalidating sex-based classifications under Equal Protection
analysis, the Supreme Court noted that:
[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the
imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a
particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate ‘the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear
38
some relationship to individual responsibility . . . .’
This passage represents the debut of immutability in federal equal
protection analysis.39 Its emergence as a basis on which to challenge sex
discrimination required a series of logical leaps, since biological
differences between the sexes had hitherto seemed like a generally valid
40
rationale for legislative distinctions. In the context of race and other axes
of identity, however, mere difference had become an insufficient
justification for discriminatory treatment. Then-attorney Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, writing on behalf of amicus ACLU in Frontiero, invoked
immutability to analogize the mechanisms of sexism to those of racism and
37

See Braman, supra note 36 at 1453.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406
U.S. 164, 175 (1972)) (plurality opinion) (1973). In Weber, the Court noted:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s condemnation
of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting this
condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing
disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system
that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or
wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth, and penalizing the
illegitimate child is an ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the
parent.
Weber, 406 U.S. at 175.
39
Immutability emerged as an equal protection factor merely two years earlier in state court. To
my knowledge, the California Supreme Court issued the first and only judicial decision prior to
Frontiero that invoked immutability as a basis for identifying a suspect classification. In 1971, the
court struck down a state law prohibiting women from tending bar. Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d
529, 540 (Cal. 1971) (deeming sex a suspect classification warranting strict scrutiny to invalidate a
state law excluding most women as bartenders).
40
A few years before these arguments surfaced, the editors of the Harvard Law Review had
pondered the peculiar skepticism accorded laws that wield racially discriminatory classifications. Why,
the editors wondered, should race, ethnicity and what the editors called “lineage” garner exceptional
treatment? “Perhaps the answer is that race and lineage are congenital and unalterable traits over which
an individual has no control and for which he should receive neither blame nor reward. . . . Yet these
factors, though significant, clearly do not constitute the complete explanation for the special judicial
treatment of suspect traits.” The editors proceed to distinguish race, lineage and ethnic origin from
“other congenital and unalterable characteristics such as sex or certain physical disabilities” on the
ground that the former classifications “will usually be perceived as a stigma of inferiority and a badge
of opprobrium.” Note, Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1126–27
(1969). Oddly, the California Supreme Court cited this discussion in Sail’er Inn while determining that
sex, as a suspect classification based on an immutable characteristic, did warrant strict scrutiny. Sail’er
Inn, 485 P.2d at 540.
38
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xenophobia: all biases that reify difference to justify status distinctions.41
Although the Court’s “accident of birth” language would seem clearly
to locate the unfairness of such an apportionment of burdens in the
congenital origins of disfavored qualities, this paradigm does not
necessarily rest on biological determinants.
As one scholar has
demonstrated persuasively, the Court generally operated with a social
rather than a biological conception of race at the time that Frontiero was
42
and its inclusion of national origin among legislative
decided,
classifications warranting special concern affirms the primacy of social and
cultural categories to the constitution of legally salient identities.
The decision from which the Court drew its language of burdens and
individual responsibility, Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company,
invalidated a state law disadvantaging non-marital children and privileging
43
marital children with respect to inheritance rights. This case thus dealt
squarely with the ultimate “accident of birth,” or illegitimacy, holding that
the children born to unmarried parents bore no responsibility for their
plight and hence seemed especially undeserving of the burdens with which
44
Yet the quality distinguishing
discriminatory legislation saddled them.
these children from those with two legally recognized parents is a social
fact with no biological significance at all; rather, it clearly bears the legacy
of cultural norms favoring domesticated sexuality over sex outside of
45
marriage.
What’s more, the jurisprudence of so-called illegitimacy long
equivocated on the degree of scrutiny to be accorded laws that deploy such
classifications. If the “accident of birth” language seems essential to
delineating those qualities that warrant the most stringent protection from
the majority, then it makes little sense that the Court has wavered in its
application of heightened scrutiny to children born outside a marriage,
occasionally applying minimal scrutiny and other times clearly heightened
46
In 1988, the Court finally identified its approach to
scrutiny.
41
See Braman, supra note 36, at 1451 & n.324, 1452 (describing Ginsburg’s involvement as the
ACLU introduced immutability to the Court in the context of sex-based classifications).
42
See id. at 1446 (noting the Court had understood racial status to be a product of social
institutions).
43
See Weber, 406 U.S. at 176 (recognizing the Equal Protection Clause as a tool to invalidate
“discriminatory laws relating to the status of birth”).
44
See id. at 175 (disapproving of liabilities imposed on illegitimate children because they bear no
responsibility for their births); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (describing legislation
which seeks to punish children for actions of their parents fails as unjust).
45
See Weber, 406 U.S. at 175–76 (“Courts are powerless to prevent the social opprobrium
suffered by these hapless children, but the Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down
discriminatory laws relating to status of birth where—as in this case—the classification is justified by
no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise.”) (footnote omitted).
46
See, e.g., Richard L. Brown, Disinheriting the “Legal Orphan”: Inheritance Rights of Children
After Termination of Parental Rights, 70 MO. L. REV. 125, 153–63 (2005) (detailing the evolution of
Supreme Court jurisprudence on non-marital children during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s).
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classifications of nonmarital children as intermediate scrutiny.
This
trajectory suggests that government policies burdening children for the
circumstances of their birth over which they have no control may
epitomize unfairness, but they have not elicited the degree of judicial
concern associated with certain other governmental distinctions.
Most post-Frontiero cases contemplating heightened scrutiny directed
focus toward the traits that characterize members of a group disadvantaged
under discriminatory legislation, elaborating those qualities of group
identity that give rise to a suspicion of animus. For example, in Lyng v.
Castillo, the Court reversed a lower court ruling applying strict scrutiny to
a provision of the federal Food Stamp Act that imposed different eligibility
requirements for close relatives—specifically parents, children, and
siblings—and distant relatives or unrelated cohabitants. Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, declared that “[c]lose relatives are not a ‘suspect’
or ‘quasi-suspect’ class. As a historical matter, they have not been
subjected to discrimination; they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and they
48
are not a minority or politically powerless.” If such characteristics mark
a group, then the motive for singling that group out may well be invidious,
bur these qualities have no necessary relationship to de jure discrimination.
And immutability stands as only one possible feature of group identity that
might suggest unjust treatment, a feature assembled with adjectives that,
read together, signal the likelihood that a particular class has garnered
recognition and disapprobation. Most disturbing of all, many courts have
missed the disjunctive locution altogether, either eliding the terms
“obvious” and “distinguishing” while citing only “immutability,” or oddly
conflating all three as mandating an inquiry into the voluntary or
49
involuntary nature of class membership.
Scholars argued convincingly in the 1990s that courts should discard
immutability as a requirement for heightened scrutiny, compiling instances
where courts already had done so.50 Its persistence as a litmus test for
47

See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“Between these extremes of rational basis review
and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to
discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.”).
48
Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (holding that cohabitating relatives presumed under
federal food stamp program to constitute a single household do not garner heightened scrutiny, which
obtains when members of the class “exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that
define them as a discrete group”); see also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602–03 (1987) (quoting
Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638).
49
See, e.g., Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006) (“To qualify as a suspect
class for purposes of an equal protection analysis, the class must . . . have as the characteristic defining
the class an obvious, immutable trait that frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute
to society . . . .”).
50
After persuasively debunking the rationales for protecting immutable groups over immutable
groups that identify fixed qualities as the greatest source of disability, Professor Kenji Yoshino
contended in 1998 that “[i]t is thus unsurprising that courts have begun to withdraw the immutability
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exacting judicial review of sexual orientation discrimination, however,
51
Instead, immutability
seems to belie this account of obsolescence.
arguments have regained salience in gay rights litigation and scholarship.52
Some courts construe immutability as a central factor in equal protection
analysis, deeming the failure to prove it an effective bar to heightened
protection for gay men and lesbians; other courts and commentators have
recast the immutability inquiry as a discussion about the centrality of
sexual orientation to personal identity. In the next Part, I briefly survey
such arguments, focusing in particular on the Connecticut Supreme Court’s
salutary contribution to this woefully muddled jurisprudence.
III. KERRIGAN AND THE NEW IMMUTABILITY
With few exceptions, claims embracing immutability proved a losing
strategy in gay rights litigation until cases began changing the object and
nature of the immutability inquiry. Most courts evaluating equal
protection challenges to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
the 1980s and 1990s declined to apply heightened scrutiny, often noting
specifically that homosexuality fails the immutability prong. They rejected
arguments for sexual orientation as a suspect classification and for the
application of strict or intermediate scrutiny on the ground that
homosexuality lacks the properties of a true identity. These cases
understood sexual orientation to describe a collection of preferences,
factor and that recent academic commentary seems univocal in calling for its retirement even as a
factor.” Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 518 (1998) (citations omitted); see also id. at 510
(lamenting the tolls exacted by assimilationist pressures to abandon putatively mutable traits). Yoshino
drew on the work of prominent scholars who had challenged the legitimacy and continued relevance of
immutability to sexual orientation discrimination. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status,
106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2323–24 (1997) (characterizing immutability as neither necessary nor sufficient
because status depends on a stable social meaning); Halley, Politics of Biology, supra note 30, at 507–
16 (arguing that courts privilege political vulnerability over immutability and noting the “lackluster
track record” of the immutability argument); Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 531, 550 (1992) (arguing that the question of immutability is less important than the question
of coercion).
51
In 1996, Professor Chai Feldblum noted that, despite her misgivings about the approach, she
continued to invoke immutability in briefs filed on behalf of LGBT groups. See Chai R. Feldblum,
Sexual Orientation, Morality and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 277–79 n.189
(1996); see also William Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group
Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1639–44 (1997) (describing
the controversy among pro-gay litigators over advancing arguments from immutability).
52
Scholars such as Marcosson have taken up Halley’s challenge to bridge the gulf between
essentialist and constructivist accounts of gay, lesbian and bisexual identity by offering a version of
immutability predicated on the idea that “social and cultural influences shape individual identity” in
powerful ways. Marcosson, supra note 29, at 650. Marcosson contends that, “[p]roperly understood
and argued, immutability has resonance both within and outside the legal sphere, and can be of
particularly great force in winning the fight for sexual and gender minorities.” Id. at 649. Marcosson’s
approach seems to have won the day in recent marriage-equality decisions issuing from California,
Connecticut and Iowa.
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propensities, behaviors, or attractions that have little or nothing in common
with group identities based on race, ethnicity, sex, or any of the other
53
“accidents of birth.” Many of these courts relied on Bowers v. Hardwick
to dismiss the notion that a class of persons defined by their potentially
criminal conduct might receive heightened judicial solicitude.54
But heresy began brewing in isolated opinions arguing for a broader
conception of immutability. The first and most extensive analysis of
heightened scrutiny for sexual-orientation discrimination appeared in
55
Judge Norris’s lengthy concurrence in Watkins v. United States Army.
Judge Norris maintained that, in reviewing a model soldier’s discharge
predicated solely on his admission of homosexuality, the Ninth Circuit
should apply strict scrutiny to strike down the military’s policy of
56
He distinguished
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.
Bowers as a due process holding with no bearing on equal protection
analysis57 and disputed the claim that the Supreme Court’s immutability
58
jurisprudence required an inability to change one’s distinguishing traits.
53
See, e.g., Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 267
(6th Cir. 1995) (“Those persons who fall within the orbit of legislation concerning sexual orientation
are so affected not because of their orientation but rather by their conduct which identifies them as
homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual.”). Although the Supreme Court vacated and remanded this case
for reconsideration in light of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Sixth Circuit affirmed its
earlier decision not to apply heightened scrutiny to legislation targeting sexual orientation and upheld
the discriminatory policy once again. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 128
F.3d 289, 301 (6th Cir.1997); see, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance
Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Homosexuality is not an immutable characteristic; it is
behavioral and hence is fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender or alienage . . . .”);
Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Members of recognized suspect or
quasi-suspect classes, e.g., blacks or women, exhibit immutable characteristics, whereas homosexuality
is primarily behavioral in nature.”); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (denying
“suspect class status for practicing homosexuals” because “[i]t would be quite anomalous, on its face,
to declare status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict
scrutiny under the equal protection clause”); Rich v. Sec’y of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir.
1984) (“A classification based on one’s choice of sexual partners is not suspect.”); cf. Thomasson v.
Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 939 (4th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing the “propensity” toward homosexuality targeted
by the military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy from “a predetermined and immutable characteristic like
race or sex” because the former reflects “an inclination” to engage in certain conduct).
54
See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (“If homosexual conduct
may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect
class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes.”); Padula, 822 F.2d
at 103 (“We therefore think the courts’ reasoning in Hardwick and Dronenburg forecloses appellant’s
efforts to gain suspect class status for practicing homosexuals. It would be quite anomolous, on its
face, to declare status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of
strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause.”).
55
See Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 711–28 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring).
56
Id. at 711, 728.
57
Id. at 716–17.
58
Id. at 726. Judge Norris advocated “[r]eading the case law in a more capacious manner, [such
that] ‘immutability’ may describe those traits that are so central to a person’s identity that it would be
abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to change them, regardless of how easy that
change might be physically.” Id.
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In 1998, an Oregon appellate court found that a state university policy
denying insurance benefits to same-sex couples while granting them to
married heterosexual couples violated the state’s constitutional guarantee
of equality with respect to the privileges and immunities of citizenship. It
ruled in the process that the lesbian plaintiffs belonged to a suspect class.
The opinion noted that Oregon courts had deemed suspect certain classes
defined by mutable characteristics such as religious affiliation and
alienage, and by potentially alterable ones such as gender. In the court’s
reading of relevant state law, “immutability—in the sense of inability to
alter or change—is not necessary” for suspect class definition. Indeed, this
inquiry properly focuses on not “the immutability of the common, classdefining characteristics, but instead the fact that such characteristics are
historically regarded as defining distinct, socially-recognized groups that
have been the subject of adverse social or political stereotyping or
59
prejudice.” Such a shift may seem subtle, but its impact should not be
understated. A focus on the particular traits that characterize members of a
disparaged group, including the origins and malleability of those traits,
yields to scrutiny of their use by the majority as a basis for adverse
treatment.60
More recently, a number of state courts have evaluated exclusionary
marriage policies as a matter of sexual orientation discrimination, some
addressing the question of immutability and others deciding the issues
without particular attention to the nature of gay, lesbian and bisexual
61
identity. Among the courts that have evaluated access to marriage as an
equal protection matter, those in California, Connecticut, and now Iowa
ruled in favor of heightened scrutiny for legal classifications based on
62
The high courts of New York, Maryland, and
sexual orientation.
59

See Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 446–48 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that the discriminatory policy violated Ore. Const. Art. I, § 20).
60
While this move corresponds to a shift in emphasis from the nature of class identity, especially
its ontological groundings, to the nature of discrimination, it should not be confused with what scholars
have lamented as the “class to classification shift” characterizing the Supreme Court’s affirmative
action jurisprudence. In the affirmative action context, the Court demonstrated an increasing
unwillingness to distinguish between racial classifications that function to subordinate historically
disadvantaged groups and such classifications that function to protect or even prioritize such groups.
See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race”: The Inversion of
Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 639 (2003);
id. at 692–93 (proposing an antisubordination approach to equal protection that would “look[] toward
ending only those governmental practices that reinforce caste”).
61
Goodridge exemplifies this latter approach, focusing on the nature of the right restricted—
marriage—rather than on the nature of the class excluded. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 954–58 (Mass. 2003). A court’s analysis is of course circumscribed, at least in part, by the
arguments before it; among the marriage cases, the parties’ arguments have emphasized due process
considerations, equal protection challenges, or both.
62
See generally In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, No. 07-1499, 2009 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 31 (Iowa
Apr. 3, 2009).
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Washington State, on the other hand, found that gay men and lesbians as a
class, and sexual orientation as a classification, fail the test for heightened
scrutiny; hence legislation affecting their interests or allotting state benefits
on the basis of heterosexual orientation warrants only rational basis
63
review.
Recent cases construing immutability as a strict requirement for
heightened scrutiny tend to hold that claims to such scrutiny for sexual
orientation classifications fail not because homosexuality describes mere
conduct or inclination, but because insufficient evidence exists to resolve
the question whether sexual orientation is static and predetermined or fluid
and volitional. For example, in Conaway v. Deane, which applied rational
basis review to a marriage statute limiting marriage to different-sex
couples, the Maryland Court of Appeals invoked immutability as a feature
of suspect and quasi-suspect classifications even though the parties had not
64
Citing to Frontiero and other
addressed immutability in their briefs.
federal cases, the court asserted confidently that “[t]he term ‘immutability’
defines a human characteristic that is determined ‘solely by the accident of
65
birth,’ or that the possessor is ‘powerless to escape or set aside.’”
Because “the scientific and sociological evidence currently available to the
public” remains equivocal on the etiology of sexual orientation and its
fixity, the court declared itself “unable to take judicial notice that gay,
lesbian, and bisexual persons display readily-recognizable, immutable
characteristics that define the group” for the purpose of heightened
66
In “the absence of some generally accepted scientific
scrutiny.
conclusion identifying homosexuality as an immutable characteristic,” no
suspect or quasi-suspect classification obtained.67
In a case decided shortly before Conaway, the Washington Supreme
Court applied rational basis review to uphold a state law restricting
marriage to different-sex couples after finding that gay and lesbian persons

63
New York’s Court of Appeals found specifically that gay men and lesbians excluded from
marriage to their partners do not belong to a suspect or quasi-suspect class with respect to the
legislation at issue because their distinguishing characteristics are relevant to the state’s interests in
defining marriage and family. The majority defined the paramount characteristic as a “preference for
the sort of sexual activity that cannot lead to the birth of children . . . .” Hernandez v. Robles, 855
N.E.2d 1, 11 (N.Y. 2006); see also id. (“Those who prefer relationships with people of the opposite sex
and those who prefer relationships with people of the same sex are not treated alike, since only
opposite-sex relationships may gain the status and benefits associated with marriage.”).
64
See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 615 n.57 (Md. 2007) (contemplating the scientific
evidence supporting the immutability of sexual orientation and the critiques of that evidence, even
though the court notes that no party has raised the issue in its briefs, and concluding that “there does
not appear to be a consensus yet among ‘experts’ as to the origin of an individual’s sexual
orientation”).
65
Id. at 614.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 616.
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68

do not qualify for heightened scrutiny.
Enumerating the criteria for
suspect-class status, the court noted that “the class must have suffered a
history of discrimination, have as the characteristic defining the class an
obvious, immutable trait that frequently bears no relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society, and show that it is a minority or
69
politically powerless class.” Note the reformulation of the Lyng factors
70
here: “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics” become “an
obvious, immutable trait.” Under this stringent requirement, a failure to
establish the immutability of homosexuality becomes a disqualification for
heightened scrutiny:
The plaintiffs do not cite other authority or any secondary
authority or studies in support of the conclusion that
homosexuality is an immutable characteristic. They focus
instead on the lack of any relation between homosexuality
and ability to perform or contribute to society. But plaintiffs
must make a showing of immutability, and they have not
71
done so in this case.
The Andersen court thus takes immutability to be a sine qua non of
heightened scrutiny under equal protection analysis.
Since Andersen and Conaway, however, challenges to marriage
discrimination have succeeded in winning heightened scrutiny of
classifications based on sexual orientation.
Before Kerrigan, the
California Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to legislation relegating
gay couples to domestic partnership while reserving civil marriage for
straight couples. In striking down this distinction, the court adopted an
72
Most
understanding of immutability as essential to self-definition.
recently, in Varnum v. Brien, the Iowa Supreme Court looked to California
and Connecticut’s marriage decisions to hold unanimously that a state ban
on same-sex marriage violated the state constitution, evaluating the
73
This
exclusion of gay and lesbian couples under heightened scrutiny.
opinion marked the third in a year to find that sexual orientation satisfied
the immutability inquiry because of its centrality to individual identity,
68

See Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006).
Id.
See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. at 638.
71
Id.
72
See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442–43 (“Because a person's sexual orientation is so
integral an aspect of one’s identity, it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his or
her sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory treatment.”). The California court’s approach to
the question of immutability echoes that of the 9th Circuit in Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d
1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Sexual orientation and sexual identity . . . are so fundamental to one’s
identity that a person should not be required to abandon them.”).
73
See Varnum v. Brien, No. 07-1499, 2009 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 31, at *7 (Iowa Apr. 3, 2009)
(holding that the Iowa marriage statute violates the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution).
69
70
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holding that “the trait defining the burdened class” need not be “absolutely
74
impervious to change.” While the California and Iowa decisions obviate
the problem of etiology, rendering scientific certainty on the origins of
homosexuality irrelevant, neither departs fully from the framework that
denies scrutiny to discriminatory policies targeting putatively volitional
qualities. Varnum, in particular, seems to accept this framework as proper,
explaining that immutability implicates “the ability of the individual to
change the characteristic responsible for the discrimination. This aspect of
immutability may separate truly victimized individuals from those who
have invited discrimination by changing themselves so as to be identified
75
In other words, the immutability inquiry purports to
with the group.”
exempt victims from blame, while in fact carving out a narrow category of
“true” victims and reserving blame for voluntary victims. Such a
distinction is both unfortunate and unnecessary.76
I noted above that some courts construe immutability as a bar to
heightened protection for gay men and lesbians, while others undertake an
analysis of immutability by emphasizing the centrality of sexual
orientation to personal identity.
Although the Kerrigan decision
corresponds generally to this latter category, its brief analysis of the
immutability issue dramatically alters its scope and implications. The
court’s discussion of the immutability factor embarks on a deceptively
modest track, one that, when read carefully, augers a major discursive
shift:
A third factor that courts have considered in determining
whether the members of a class are entitled to heightened
protection for equal protection purposes is whether the
attribute or characteristic that distinguishes them is
immutable or otherwise beyond their control. Of course, the
characteristic that distinguishes gay persons from others and
qualifies them for recognition as a distinct and discrete group
is the characteristic that historically has resulted in their
social and legal ostracism, namely, their attraction to persons
77
of the same sex.
Far from stating the obvious as its “of course” would suggest, this gloss on
the significance of the distinguishing characteristic that separates gays
from straights offers a subtle corrective to existing analyses, with their
74

Id. at *73.
Id. at *75.
76
See Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation, supra note 29, at 1303 (“Such
instances evoke abhorrence not because the state is burdening the individual for an ‘immutable’
characteristic, but rather because it is burdening the individual’s choice to be different.”).
77
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 436 (Conn. 2008) (citation omitted).
75
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misguided inquiry into the causes and permanence of sexual orientation.
In the discussion that follows, the Kerrigan court proceeds persuasively to
discount the significance of immutability to heightened scrutiny, and to
read its scope broadly—consistent with Judge Norris’s concurrence, the
Tanner court, and the two recent opinions out of California and Iowa—to
implicate characteristics central to personal identity, if not either genetic in
78
origin or entirely impervious to change. But the passage above offers yet
another reading of immutability, one that turns not on the significance of
individual self-definition or the question of volition, but rather on the
persistence of “social and legal ostracism” as the relevant aspect of group
definition.
On the one hand, then, Justice Palmer’s majority opinion falls prey to
the same analytic oversight that plagues the jurisprudence of immutability,
setting up its discussion of the relevant factors for according suspect or
quasi-suspect status to a class by quoting the language from Lyng and then
eliding two of the three enumerated criteria. It identifies as one of two
additional considerations whether “the characteristic that defines the
members of the class as a discrete group is immutable or otherwise not
79
within their control,” and then cites as support the passage from Lyng
announcing a test for suspect status in determinations whether “members
of the class ‘exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics
80
that define them as a discrete group.’” Again, this cluster of adjectives
collapses into one: “immutable,” with its emphasis on the permanent and
involuntary nature of defining qualities.
On the other hand, the emphasis on the “social and legal ostracism” of
gay men, lesbians and bisexuals, both here and throughout the opinion,
offers a welcome antidote to the misplaced focus on group identity and
membership that the immutability jurisprudence has invited. This
conception of identity underscores its social and legal dimensions rather
than stressing the significance of internal self or group-definition. In other
words, it reminds us that equal protection analysis is centrally concerned
with status—not in the sense of one’s stable identity, but in the sense of
81
one’s access to the rights and protections afforded the majority.
Throughout the opinion, Kerrigan eloquently recounts the history of de
78
Id. at 438 (“In view of the central role that sexual orientation plays in a person’s fundamental
right to self-determination, we fully agree with the plaintiffs that their sexual orientation represents the
kind of distinguishing characteristic that defines them as a discrete group for purposes of determining
whether that group should be afforded heightened protection under the equal protection provisions of
the state constitution.”).
79
Id. at 426.
80
Id. (citing Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (2006)).
81
In his recent book Racial Culture, Professor Richard Ford analyzed the immutability question
in terms of ascriptive status: “Once a status is ascribed, it is ‘immutable’ in the pragmatic sense that the
individual cannot readily alter it. This is the sense in which immutability is relevant to antidiscrimination law.” RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 103 (2005).
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facto and de jure ostracism that has defined the gay community in the
82
United States. This history and the inferior status that attends pervasive
cultural norms around homosexuality offer ample grounds for satisfying
83
the new immutability inquiry.
IV. CHOOSING SELF-DETERMINATION
Let us return to the vexed issue of choice in discussions of sexual
orientation. Its political currency notwithstanding, the question of whether
homosexuality is chosen or determined at birth need not play a role in
equal protection jurisprudence. But what about in public debate?
Although scholars in a variety of disciplines have challenged biological
84
immutability as a fruitless or even dangerous avenue of inquiry, the
biological approach to sexual orientation has taken hold in popular culture.
Many commentators have noted a strange throwback to taxonomical
discourses of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: theories of
homosexuality that posited a third sex, the separate identity of “invert,” or
85
This
a pathology that differed from mere sinful or criminal behavior.
trope of congenital homosexuality—in contrast to theories of acquired or
mutable homosexuality—boasts a long history in Western culture, one that
scholars have recounted extensively. In most of its nineteenth and early
twentieth-century elaborations, the figure of “the homosexual” constituted
a physiological and psychological anomaly whose mystery could be
deciphered only by the medically trained investigator.
Historians of science and sexuality have traced the two primary strains
82
See in particular Kerrigan’s lengthy discussions of the political powerlessness and history of
discrimination afflicting gay persons. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431–34
(Conn. 2008).
83
The court draws heavily from Justice Thurgood Marshall’s concurring and dissenting opinion
in Cleburne v. Cleburne Learning Center, Inc., where he wrote:
The discreteness and insularity warranting a “more searching judicial inquiry” . .
. must therefore be viewed from a social and cultural perspective as well as a
political one. To this task judges are well suited, for the lessons of history and
experience are surely the best guide as to when, and with respect to what interests,
society is likely to stigmatize individuals as members of an inferior caste or view
them as not belonging to the community. Because prejudice spawns prejudice, and
stereotypes produce limitations that confirm the stereotype on which they are based,
a history of unequal treatment requires sensitivity to the prospect that its vestiges
endure. In separating those groups that are discrete and insular from those that are
not, as in many important legal distinctions, “a page of history is worth a volume of
logic.”
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 429–30 n.22 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Learning Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432
472–73 n.24 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citation
omitted)).
84
For an overview of this argument, see generally STEIN, supra note 28; TERRY, supra note 28;
Halley, supra note 30; Knauer, supra note 31; Yoshino, supra note 50.
85
See, e.g., Knauer, supra note 31, at 10 (“The science of immutability that undergirds the
contemporary gay political narrative belongs to a longstanding tradition that attempts to explain or
define the homosexual condition in scientific terms.”).
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of investigative inquiries into homosexuality that reigned through most of
the twentieth century, both following from the work of late nineteenthcentury sexologists: one focused on the particular psychical and
physiological qualities of gay men and lesbians, and the other interested
more broadly in sex practices and erotic desires across broad swaths of the
86
population. For the majority of the twentieth century, scientific interest
in
homosexuality
coalesced
largely
around
its
allegedly
psychopathological dimensions; indeed, until its elimination from the DSM
in 1973, homosexuality constituted a psychic malady of considerable
87
moment.
The embrace of immutability within LGBT communities reflects a
notable shift: where these communities once organized around a
commitment to sexual freedom and rejection of compulsory
heterosexuality, they began to self-define according to a shared essence. A
model of sexual orientation predicated on innate but benign differences
offered itself as an alternative to the view of gay men, lesbians, and
bisexuals as mentally ill; instead, they could be understood as a distinct
and natural species of person. Whereas Bowers construed homosexuals as
both the sum of their sodomitical acts and the reason such acts are despised
88
and immoral, the mainstreaming of LGBT politics evident in Lawrence
and the marriage litigation has mobilized the argument that gays are just
like straights, only (benignly) different.89
Arguments around choice and determinism have evolved dialectically.
As I indicated above, religious conservatives seized upon choice to counter
claims that homosexuality is organic and that gay persons deserve
tolerance because their identity reflects a harmless and involuntary
difference. In response, mainstream LGBT organizations and advocates
reaffirmed the we-can’t-help-it logic in order to avert the blame attached to

86
These two strains correspond to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s minoritizing and universalizing
models of homosexuality: “To be gay, or to be potentially classifiable as gay . . . is to come under the
radically overlapping aegises of a universalizing discourse of acts or bonds and at the same time of a
minoritizing discourse of kinds of persons.” SEDGWICK, supra note 24, at 54.
87
See generally JENNIFER TERRY, AN AMERICAN OBSESSION: SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND
HOMOSEXUALITY IN MODERN SOCIETY passim (Univ. of Chicago Press 1999); SCIENCES AND
HOMOSEXUALITIES passim (Vernon A. Rosario ed., Routledge 1997).
88
See, e.g., Halley, Act and Identity, supra note 30, at 1770.
89
See generally Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615, 1619–
32 (2004) (identifying the like-straight logic of Lawrence, which grants liberty protections to gay
people to the extent they resemble idealized straight people); Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s
Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1399–1400 (2005) (identifying the like-straight logic of Goodridge and
lamenting the strategic decision to promote an “immaculate conception of gay and lesbian identities” in
marriage litigation); see also Courtney Megan Cahill, “If Sex Offenders Can Marry, Then Why Not
Gays and Lesbians?”: An Essay on the Progressive Comparative Argument, 55 BUFFALO L. REV. 777,
796–99 (critiquing the like-straight logic of recent gay rights litigation).
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willful deviance and subversion of community norms. And marriage as
the central, normalizing goal of the gay rights movement from mid-1990s
on has taken the just-like-you-only-different argument to a new level.
These days, few proponents of same-sex marriage predicate their strongest
claims to access for gay and lesbian couples on the argument that this
bundle of state-sponsored benefits should be broadly available to diverse
family forms. Much less do they advocate that marriage be evacuated of
its disciplinary force to privilege conforming subjects over nonconforming
ones. Instead, their rhetoric emphasizes the extent to which same-sex
couples embrace all the norms of marital heterosexuality save the one that
91
their essential nature disallows.
Not only is the “we-can’t-help-it” approach unpalatable, but the ceding
of choice to opponents of gay rights is misguided on other grounds.
Historians of science, queer theorists, and other scholars have challenged
the new sexual orientation research and the scientistic turn in LGBT rights
arguments, claiming that the studies themselves suffer from conceptual
flaws. They contend that those who wield such research to argue for legal
protection and popular acceptance ignore the dangers of eugenics and the
use of scientific research in the past to isolate and pathologize gay men and
92
lesbians. Moreover, choice remains central to liberal democratic ideals
of self and culture, and the historic treatment of homosexuality cautions
against embracing compulsion over volition. As I have documented
elsewhere, the psychiatric turn in medico-legal reasoning cast
homosexuality as a state of diminished will and impaired self-governance.
Medico-legal discourse figured “the homosexual” as a subject incapable of
93
Hence models of
exercising self-restraint and self-determination.
identity that posit sexual orientation as an innate condition outside of
human agency, despite their apparent expediency in arguments for
90
A recent column in Slate magazine reported that the much-remarked racial disparities in
support for California’s Proposition 8, the constitutional amendment overriding the California Supreme
Court’s landmark decision in the Marriage Cases, derived primarily from different views among black
and white voters about the immutability of sexual orientation.
The mutability question is hardly academic. It has been driving public opinion
toward gay rights for decades. . . . In Pew and Gallup surveys, respondents’
positions on mutability overwhelmingly predict their positions on gay marriage and
homosexuality’s acceptability. Pew puts the equation bluntly: ‘Belief that
homosexuality is immutable [is] associated with positive opinions about gays and
lesbians even more strongly than education, personal acquaintance with a
homosexual, or general ideological beliefs.’
William Saletan, Original Sin: Blacks, Gays and Immutability, SLATE, Nov. 13 2008, available at
http://www.slate.com/id/2204534/.
91
See generally MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (2000).
92
See generally, NANCY ORDOVER, AMERICAN EUGENICS: RACE, QUEER ANATOMY, AND THE
SCIENCE OF NATIONALISM (2003).
93
See Susan R. Schmeiser, The Ungovernable Citizen: Psychopathy, Sexuality, and the Rise of
Medico-Legal Reasoning, 20 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 163, 169–71 (2008).
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equality, resonate strongly with views of homosexuality as incompatible
with self-control and therefore full democratic citizenship.
V. CONCLUSION
In a dialogue with philosophers Ian Hacking and Martha Nussbaum
upon the publication his book The Mismeasure of Desire: The Science,
Theory and Ethics of Sexual Orientation, Ed Stein addressed their concern
that his anti-essentialist position on homosexuality might undermine his
ability “to convince people that sexual orientations are unchosen and
94
Eschewing this approach altogether, Stein instead
unchangeable.”
maintained that:
[A] more promising and important project would be to try to
convince them that a person’s sexual orientation is not
something one should want to change. Rather than trying to
convince people that sexual orientations are immutable, I
would prefer to try to convince them that we should change
the legal and social norms regarding lesbians, gay men,
bisexuals and others whose sexual desires make them social
95
pariahs.
The jurisprudence of equal protection offers a perfect forum for such
persuasion, at least in theory. In practice, doctrines of immutability have,
until recently, frustrated efforts to combat systematic discrimination
against sexual minorities. While I contend that these doctrines reflect a
muddled and often misguided jurisprudence, the conception of
immutability that Kerrigan represents might indeed prove germane to the
project Stein outlines here. Kerrigan situates immutability as an effect,
rather than a cause, of discrimination—capturing the inalterable status of
social pariah that results from a history of ostracism and censure. Legal
reform might indeed change the immutable.

94

Edward Stein, Reply to Martha Nussbaum and Ian Hacking, 21 LAW & PHILOS. 349, 352

(2002).
95

Id.

